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O B J E C T O R S
In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Devlin v. Scardelletti that objecting class mem-
bers could appeal a federal district court’s approval of a class settlement without first inter-
vening in the litigation. Public interest lawyer Brian Wolfman says the ruling was a victory
for both objectors and the integrity of class action procedure: Objectors, he argues, help
keep fairness hearings fair.
But a number of courts are now ruling that Devlin only applies to non-opt-out class ac-
tions, rather than the much more numerous ones that give class members opt-out rights. In
this article, Wolfman details the exact wording of the Supreme Court decision and asserts
that the high court clearly did not limit the application of Devlin.
Preventing the Subversion of Devlin v. Scardelletti
BY BRIAN WOLFMAN
I n Devlin v. Scardelletti,
1 the Supreme Court held
that, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a
member of a class who objects to a proposed class
action settlement may appeal the district court’s ap-
proval of the settlement without having first intervened
in the action. Devlin was a victory for class action ob-
jectors and the integrity of class action procedure more
generally. But there is a movement afoot to undermine
Devlin by limiting it to the relatively small category of
non-opt-out class settlements. The purpose of this ar-
ticle is to help stop that movement.2
1 536 U.S. 1 (2002).
2 As a matter of full disclosure, I was co-counsel for the vic-
torious Mr. Devlin, and the result is one that my office had
been urging in cases in which we represented objectors.
Brian Wolfman is the director of Public Citi-
zen Litigation Group, a public interest law
firm in Washington, D.C. He can be reached
at brian@citizen.org.
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Introduction
Two preliminary points: First, class actions are enor-
mously powerful tools for justice. For decades, they
have righted wrongs and compensated victims of dis-
crimination, provided a means for reforming oppressive
or recalcitrant governmental institutions, and deterred
a wide array of wrongful business conduct in situations
where individuals would not have had the means to sue
on their own. But class actions can be abused, which in
turn sours the public and provides fodder for politi-
cians, jeopardizing the prospect of justice for ordinary
citizens. Even just a handful of ‘‘sell out’’ settlements,
and courts willing to approve them, can lead Congress
to ill-advised ‘‘reforms,’’ such as the misnamed Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005,3 which provides defen-
dants with their choice of forum in most class actions,
but will do little or nothing to curb abuses that occur
when defendants seek out the most malleable lawyer to
settle potentially meritorious class actions at bargain-
basement prices.
Although the great majority of class actions are not
abusive and most seek to address real problems, the po-
tential for class action abuse is real. In individual litiga-
tion, the clients (the principals) usually can monitor
their lawyer (the agent). By contrast, the agency rela-
tionship in class actions defies monitoring because the
absent clients have no real relationship with their law-
yers. And, even if they did, given the small amounts per
person generally at stake in class actions, they would
not rationally expend the time and resources to oversee
their lawyers’ work. As a result, as one court put it, ‘‘the
[class] lawyers might urge a class settlement at a low
figure or on a less-than-optimal basis in exchange for
red-carpet treatment for fees.’’4 As for the defendants,
they care only about minimizing their overall liability,
and they are indifferent as to how the pot is split be-
tween lawyers and clients.5 Thus, if we are concerned
about the potential for class action abuse, we will also
be concerned about assuring that class action
objectors—who do monitor the class lawyers’ conduct—
have a full and fair opportunity to participate in the
class action settlement process.6
Second, lawyers representing objectors to class ac-
tion settlements will never win a popularity contest. Af-
ter all, objectors are very annoying to both the plaintiffs
and the defendants. By the time objectors appear, the
named parties have come to an agreement that will of-
ten affect the rights of tens of thousands of people, and
involve tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars and
a multi-million dollar attorneys’ fee request. By that
time, the defendant has usually spent hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars or more notifying the class, and it cer-
tainly does not want the deal to go sour. Even the dis-
trict court, which has preliminarily approved the settle-
ment and permitted the notice to be sent to the class,
sometimes seems invested in approval.7 As Judge Rich-
ard A. Posner has put it, ‘‘with all the momentum that a
settlement agreement generates, . . . the class members
are presented with what looks like a fait accompli.’’8 It
is thus not surprising that, as one oft-cited Federal Judi-
cial Center study found, 90 percent of federal class ac-
tion settlements are approved without any substantive
changes.9
If we are concerned about the potential for class
action abuse, we will also be concerned about
assuring that class action objectors—who do
monitor the class lawyers’ conduct—have a full
and fair opportunity to participate in the class
action settlement process.
One potential solution to the ‘‘fait accompli’’ problem
is to insist that district judges carefully scrutinize class
action settlements with such heightened awareness that
they act as fiduciaries for the absent class.10 But that is
not as easy as it sounds. The district court often cannot
get the information it needs to fully assess the fairness
and legality of the settlement. The settling parties, at
one time adversaries, are now on the same side. And al-
though Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) requires a
‘‘fairness hearing’’ at which the judge must assess the
pros and cons of the settlement, the settling parties do
not, of course, engage in an adversary presentation, but
rather praise the settlement to the heavens, while ignor-
ing its weaknesses or illegalities. Judge Frank Easter-
brook has bluntly put it:
[A] settlement followed by a fairness hearing remains
more like a contract than like litigation . . . [in which
there is] a genuine contest. Representative plaintiffs
and their lawyers may be imperfect agents of the other
class members—may even put one over on the court, in
a staged performance.11
In sum, in this otherwise non-adversarial setting, ob-
jectors play an important role because they serve as
counterweights to a process that heavily favors settle-
ment approval and to participants who have an interest
in cutting off debate.
3 P.L. 109-2.
4 Weinberger v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d
518, 524 (1st Cir. 1991).
5 Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 964 (9th Cir. 2003)
(citing In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank
Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 819-20 (3d Cir. 1995)); Prandini v. National
Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1020 (3d Cir. 1977).
6 See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, et al., Class Action
Dilemmas—Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain 491-96
(Rand Inst. for Civil Justice 2000).
7 See, e.g, Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Illinois Nat’l
Bank and Trust Co., 834 F.2d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 1987); Susan
P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, ‘‘Under Cloak of Settlement,’’
82 Va. L. Rev. 1051, 1122-28 (1996).
8 Mars Steel, 834 F.2d at 680-81.
9 Thomas E. Willging et al., ‘‘An Empirical Analysis of Rule
23 to Address Rulemaking Challenges,’’ 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74,
141 (1996).
10 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277,
28081 (7th Cir. 2002); In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up
Truck Fuel Tank Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784 (3d Cir. 1995).
11 Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 100 F.3d 1348, 1352
(7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting from denial of re-
hearing en banc).
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The Problem Pre-Devlin
To be sure, in the district court, objectors can try to
counter this hydraulic pressure for approval, and occa-
sionally they defeat settlements.12 But objectors’ coun-
sel often find that, in fighting unfair and unlawful class
action settlements, the appellate courts—which are
more removed from these pressures—are more sympa-
thetic to their arguments and more apt to establish le-
gal principles that will protect the rights of absentees.13
The settling parties understand this. So, for years,
they waged an effort to prevent objectors from appeal-
ing, arguing that objectors did not have ‘‘standing’’ to
appeal unless they first became intervenors in the dis-
trict court. And, somewhat surprisingly, a fair number
of circuit courts agreed.14 This reality made objector
practice very difficult. At first, many objectors were
caught unawares by the intervention requirements.15
After all, class action notices always affirmatively state
that class members may object by filing a timely objec-
tion in the district court, and they never even hint that
objectors must intervene to preserve their appellate
rights.16 Moreover, even when absent class members
were aware of the intervention requirement and did
move to intervene, those motions were often denied on
the ground that the class representatives—the very
people that the objectors opposed—adequately repre-
sented the objectors’ interests, or on the ground that the
objectors’ intervention was untimely because they had
not moved to intervene before the settlement was an-
nounced.17 Not only were appellate rights thus effec-
tively undermined in many circuits, but with appellate
safety valves weakened, settling parties felt freer to
make life even more difficult for objectors in the district
court—filing their papers in support of the settlement
on the eve of the fairness hearing, denying objectors ac-
cess to relevant information, and making even more
one-sided fairness hearing presentations.
Devlin to the Rescue
Then came Devlin. Writing for a seven-Justice major-
ity, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor held that any class
member who timely objects to a class action settlement
may, like any other litigant facing an adverse final deci-
sion of a district court, appeal as of right to the court of
appeals from the approval of a class action settlement.
Devlin contained two key holdings. First, it rejected
lower court decisions that characterized the issue as
one of ‘‘standing.’’ Class members’ standing does not
depend on having intervened in a class action in which
they are already a member of the plaintiff class; they
have standing to appeal, the Court held, for the same
reason that they had standing to object: They are mem-
bers of a class whose property or other interests are at
stake in the approval of a class action settlement.18 Sec-
ond, the Court rejected the notion, accepted by many
courts of appeals, that class members must intervene as
a prerequisite to appeal because, absent intervention,
they are not ‘‘parties’’ to the action.19 The Court ac-
knowledged that absent class members are considered
‘‘parties’’ for some purposes and not others.20 But in the
context of whether they should be permitted to appeal
an adverse judgment only one fact really matters to the
plaintiffs and the defendants alike: If the settlement is
finally approved, it will have binding effect on the ab-
sent class members and permanently extinguish their
rights.21 In that very important sense, the absentees are
just like the named class representatives and hence are
parties entitled to appeal.
Or Not?
Devlin made the difficult life of an objector a bit
easier. Or so we thought. The ink was not yet dry on the
decision before settling parties sought to eviscerate
Devlin by arguing that it applies only to so-called man-
datory classes—classes certified pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) and (2) that do not af-
ford class members a right to opt out. To oversimplify
somewhat, Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) non-opt-out class
actions generally involve claims solely for injunctive re-
lief or similar relief that, as a practical matter, can only
be afforded to the class as a whole. (Devlin itself in-
volved a Rule 23(b)(1) non-opt-out settlement.) On the
other hand, Rule 23(b)(3) class actions—which consti-
tute the vast majority of class actions—apply to cases in
which the class members have claims for monetary re-
lief. In (b)(3) cases, class members must be allowed to
opt out.22
The effort to undermine Devlin began innocently
enough, with a decision from the Arkansas Supreme
Court holding that, under Arkansas’s counterpart to
federal Rule 23, the right to appeal established in Dev-
lin should apply only to members of mandatory class
actions.23 Although Ballard interpreted only Arkansas
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, it quickly had an effect in
the federal courts. Just two months later, in In re Gen-
eral American Life Insurance Company Sales Practices
12 See, e.g., In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 185
F. Supp.2d 519 (D. Md. 2002); In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II
Prods. Liab. Litig., 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3507 (E.D. La. Mar.
20, 1995).
13 See Georgine v. Amchem Prods. Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir.
1996), aff’d Amchem Prods, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591
(1997); General Motors, 55 F.3d 768; see also, e.g., Smith v.
Sprint Communications Co., 387 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2004); Sta-
ton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2003); In re Orthope-
dic Bone Screw Products Liability Litigation, 246 F.3d 315 (3d
Cir. 2001); In re Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., 221 F.3d
870 (6th Cir. 2000).
14 See, e.g., Cook v. Powell Buick Inc., 155 F.3d 758, 760
(5th Cir. 1998); Shults v. Champion Intern. Corp.35 F.3d 1056
(6th Cir. 1994); Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004, 1006 (10th Cir.
1993).
15 For instance, in Bowling v. Pfizer Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141
(S.D. Ohio 1992), appeal dismissed, 1993 WL 533489 (6th Cir.
Dec. 21,1993), the Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal of a major
nationwide settlement on the ground that the objectors had not
intervened, even though prior reported decisions of that court
held that non-intervening objectors had the right to appeal a
class settlement. See, e.g., Sertic v. Cuyahoga, Lake, Etc., Car-
penters Dist. Council, 459 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1972).
16 See Manual for Complex Litigation Third, § 41.43, at 488
(Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1995) (model class action notice).
17 See, e.g., In re Teletronics Pacing Systems Inc, 1999 WL
305511, *1-*2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 5, 1999), rev’d, 221 F.3d 870,
881-82 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Devlin, 536 U.S. at 5 (describ-
ing lower court’s denial of intervention as untimely).
18 Devlin, 536 U.S. at 6-7.
19 Id. at 8-9.
20 Id. at 9-10.
21 Id. at 10.
22 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
23 Ballard v. Advance America, 79 S.W.3d 835 (Ark. 2002).
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Litigation, the Eighth Circuit, relying on Ballard in
dicta—dicta because the court dismissed the appeal as
moot—proclaimed that limiting Devlin to mandatory
classes ‘‘has considerable merit.’’24 Last year, the Elev-
enth Circuit characterized ‘‘the point of Devlin’’ as
‘‘allow[ing] appeals by parties who are actually bound
by a judgment, not parties who merely could have been
bound by the judgment,’’ and posited that it was ‘‘[t]his
feature of Devlin’’ that led the Arkansas Supreme Court
‘‘to believe that it applies only to mandatory class ac-
tions.’’25 The Eleventh Circuit also noted the Eighth Cir-
cuit’s ‘‘tentative approval’’ of limiting Devlin to manda-
tory class actions, but itself expressed no opinion on the
issue, which was not presented in the case before it.26
And, recently, a Florida state appellate court, interpret-
ing the Florida class action rule, held that Devlin ap-
plies only in mandatory class actions, expressing its
agreement with the reasoning of the Arkansas Supreme
Court and the Eighth Circuit.27
Only two federal circuits have definitively decided the
question, and, fortunately, both have held that Devlin
applies to mandatory and opt-out classes.28 That being
the case, this Article may seem alarmist. However, as
explained further below, because it is now clear that
settling parties will contest non-intervening objectors’
rights to appeal settlement approval in opt-out cases,
objectors now find themselves in a difficult position. In
most of the country, they must seek and be granted in-
tervention, lest they risk losing their appellate rights
down the road. That result is exactly what Devlin ren-
dered unnecessary, and any movement in that direction
should be nipped in the bud.
Devlin Means What It Says
The efforts at limiting Devlin to non-opt-out classes,
and the Eighth Circuit’s ‘‘considerable merit’’ dictum,
are based on one sentence from the Devlin opinion that,
even viewed in isolation, does not support the limita-
tion. Moreover, all other aspects of the ruling in Devlin
indicate that it applies to opt-out, as well as non-opt-out,
class actions.
First of all, the question presented on which the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari was not limited to man-
datory classes, nor did it even mention that petitioner
Devlin was a member of one.29
More important, after describing the facts of the case
and the procedures below, the Supreme Court ex-
plained why it had granted review: ‘‘We granted certio-
rari [citation omitted] to resolve a disagreement among
the Circuits as to whether nonnamed class members
who fail to intervene may bring an appeal of the ap-
proval of a settlement.’’30 This statement of the ques-
tion presented did not even hint that the ruling would
be limited to mandatory classes.
The Court then cited the decisions that formed the
split in circuit court authority. Almost all of the cases
cited, including all of the decisions holding that inter-
vention was not required to appeal from approval of a
class settlement, were Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class ac-
tions.31 It would have been spectacularly odd for the
Supreme Court to have silently limited its holding to
mandatory classes because such a holding would not
have resolved the very question, and the very circuit
split, that the Court claimed to be resolving.32
Moreover, with the exception of its one reference to
the non-opt-out nature of the Devlin case (discussed be-
low), Devlin repeatedly described the issue before it
broadly in ways that would encompass Rule 23(b)(3)
opt-out class actions.33
24 302 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 2002); see also In re Wireless Tele-
phone Federal Cost Recovery Fees Litig., 396 F.3d 922, 929-30
(8th Cir. 2005) (refusing to provide an advisory opinion on the
issue because appellant only sought ruling on applicability of
Devlin and did not object to settlement terms); Snell v. Allianz
Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 327 F.3d 665, 670 n.2 (8th Cir. 2003)
(suggesting in dicta that Devlin does not apply to opt-out class
actions).
25 AAL High Yield Bond Fund v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 361
F.3d 1305, 1310 & n.7 (11th Cir. 2004).
26 Id. at 1310 n.7.
27 Barnhill v. Florida Microsoft Anti-trust Litig., __ So.2d __,
2005 WL 766971, *1-*2 (Fla. App., 3d Dist., Apr. 6, 2005) (also
reversing trial court’s denial of intervention).
28 Churchill Village LLC v. General Electric, 361 F.3d 566,
572-73 (9th Cir. 2004); In re Integra Realty Resources Inc., 354
F.3d 1246, 1257 (10th Cir. 2004). The Seventh Circuit has con-
sidered an appeal by objectors in an opt-out case, citing Dev-
lin, without addressing a possible distinction between manda-
tory and opt-out class actions. In re Synthroid Marketing Litig.,
325 F.3d 974, 976-77 (7th Cir. 2003). In an earlier pre-Devlin
appeal in the same case, the Seventh Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court’s denial of the objectors’ motion to intervene and
heard the appeal on its merits. See In re Synthroid Marketing
Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 2001). Moreover, at least two
circuits have stated Devlin’s holding broadly, but have not ad-
dressed the mandatory vs. opt-out issue. See In re Rite Aid
Corp. Securities Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2005); In re
Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 350 F.3d 360, 363
n.3 (3d Cir. 2003); In the Matter of Bridgestone/Firestone Inc.
Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 768 (7th Cir. 2003); see
also Batchelder v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 246 F. Supp. 2d 525, 530
n.1 (N.D. Miss. 2003). A few state courts have also upheld
broad no-intervention rules, relying on Devlin. See, e.g., City of
San Benito v. Rio Grande Valley Gas. Co., 109 S.W.2d 750,
754-56 (Tex. 2003); Nicholson v. F. Hoffman LaRoche Ltd., 576
S.E.2d 363, 365 (N.C. App. 2003).
29 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at i, in Devlin v.
Scardelletti, No. 01-417 (filed Sept. 7, 2001) (‘‘Whether a class
member who, upon receiving notice of a proposed class action
settlement, objects and intervenes has standing to appeal the
district court’s approval of the settlement.’’). The question pre-
sented suggests that Mr. Devlin intervened in the action. Al-
though he had moved to intervene in the district court, the mo-
tion was denied as untimely. See Devlin, 536 U.S. at 5. His un-
successful attempt to intervene played no role in the Supreme
Court’s decision.
30 Devlin, 536 U.S. at 6.
31 See id. (citing In re Paine Webber Inc. Ltd. Partnerships
Litig., 94 F.3d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1996); Carlough v. Amchem
Prods. Inc., 5 F.3d 707, 711 (3d Cir. 1993); Marshall v. Holiday
Magic Inc., 550 F.2d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 1977)).
32 Of the four cases cited by the Supreme Court that had
held intervention a prerequisite to appeal, two indisputably
were opt-out class actions. See Cook v. Powell Buick Inc., 155
F.3d 758, 760 (5th Cir. 1998); Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004,
1006 (10th Cir. 1993). In one case, the opinion does not reveal
whether certification was mandatory or opt-out. See Shults v.
Champion Intern. Corp.35 F.3d 1056 (6th Cir. 1994). Only one
case cited by the Supreme Court, Guthrie v. Evans, 815 F.2d
626 (11th Cir. 1987), clearly involved non-opt-out certification;
however, Guthrie did not involve a class action settlement but
rather an attempt by an absent class member to appeal a liti-
gated judgment entered in district court proceedings in which
the absentee had not participated.
33 See, e.g., Devlin, 536 U.S. at 6 (describing Fourth Cir-
cuit’s holding); id. at 7 (‘‘Respondents argue that, because pe-
titioner is not a named class representative and did not suc-
cessfully move to intervene, he is not a party for the purposes
4
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Finally, at the end of the Devlin opinion—the place
where the Court tends to state its holding most
definitively—the holding is not limited to mandatory
class actions, but instead includes all class actions:
We hold that nonnamed class members like petitioner
who have objected to approval of the settlement at the
fairness hearing have the power to bring an appeal
without first intervening.34
The sole basis for the argument that Devlin applies
only to mandatory classes is the following sentence
from the Court’s opinion:
Particularly in light of the fact that petitioner had no
ability to opt out of the settlement, see Fed. R. Civ.
Proc. 23(b)(1), appealing the approval of the settlement
is petitioner’s only means of protecting himself from
being bound from a disposition of his rights he finds
unacceptable and a reviewing court might find legally
inadequate.35
This sentence, even if it were the only indicator of the
Court’s intent, does not support a limited reading of
Devlin. The sentence describes Mr. Devlin’s difficult cir-
cumstances and thus was illustrative, in the Supreme
Court’s view, of why an intervention requirement was
unwarranted. The sentence includes no words of limita-
tion. Quite the contrary, by premising the sentence with
the word ‘‘particularly,’’ the Court indicated that the
non-opt-out character of the Devlin class action was a
special and additional, not a necessary, part of its ratio-
nale.36
Limiting Devlin to Mandatory Classes
Makes No Sense
Even if there were some doubt from the text of the
opinion as to whether Devlin applies to all class actions,
there would be no reason to resolve that doubt by limit-
ing Devlin to mandatory classes. The argument in sup-
port of the limitation is premised on the notion that
Rule 23(b)(3) class members who are dissatisfied with a
settlement can opt out and, therefore, because they can
escape the settlement’s binding effect, they do not need
to appeal.37 But that argument misapprehends the way
most class actions work.
First, except for so-called ‘‘settlement classes,’’
where certification and settlement take place simulta-
neously,38 class certification, and thus the right to opt
out, occurs in advance (sometimes years in advance) of
settlement. Under a recent amendment to the federal
class action rule, district courts have discretion to allow
a second opt-out when a case settles, but they are not
required to do so.39 In opt-out cases where class mem-
bers are not provided the right to opt out at settlement,
it is difficult to see how an appealing objector’s situation
differs at all from the situation in which Mr. Devlin
found himself.
Second, and more important, it is well understood
that in many, and possibly most, Rule 23(b)(3) class ac-
tions, the opt-out right is not meaningful. In the quin-
tessential Rule 23(b)(3) class action, the class members
have relatively modest amounts at stake. Take, for in-
stance, a situation where class members claim that their
credit card company defrauded them by imposing an
unlawful fee or that they were victimized by stock price
manipulation that, while providing a huge windfall to
company insiders, harmed the class members for rela-
tively small amounts per share. Absent unusual circum-
stances, these class members would not rationally opt
out because their cases are not valuable enough to sup-
port individual litigation. Indeed, the main goal of the
modern damages class action is to aggregate relatively
small claims that otherwise would not be redressed.40
Thus, for all practical purposes, most class members in
opt-out class actions facing an unfair or unlawful class
action settlement find themselves identically situated to
their counterparts in mandatory class actions.41 For
both, the only practical way to fight the settlement is to
object in the district court and appeal if the district
court approves it.
Moreover, whatever one might have thought before
Devlin about the question whether intervention should
be required, one benefit of an all-inclusive, no-
intervention rule is that it will avoid satellite litigation
concerning intervention. Prior to Devlin, there was an
enormous amount of such litigation.42 Devlin, it
seemed, had put an end to all of that. Now, sadly, objec-
tors in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions—which, as noted,
comprise most class actions—unless they are in the
Ninth or Tenth Circuits, would be well advised to move
to intervene, because they cannot be sure what the rule
of taking an appeal.’’); id. at 9 (‘‘Nor does considering non-
named class members parties for purposes of bringing an ap-
peal conflict with any other aspect of class action procedure.’’);
id. at 10 (‘‘Nonnamed class members are, for instance, parties
in the sense that the filing of an action on behalf of the class
tolls the statute of limitations against them.’’); id. (‘‘To hold
otherwise would deprive nonnamed class members of the
power to preserve their own interests in a settlement that will
ultimately bind them’’); id. at 11-14 (describing and rebutting
government’s views, none of which made distinction between
mandatory and opt-out class actions); id. at 12 (‘‘Given the
ease with which nonnamed class members who have objected
at the fairness hearing could intervene for purposes of appeal,
however, it is difficult to see the value of the Government’s
suggested requirement.’’).
34 Id. at 14. Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent gave no indica-
tion that he viewed the majority’s holding as applying only to
mandatory classes. To the contrary, Justice Scalia decried the
decision’s far-reaching effects on appellate courts, Devlin, 536
U.S. at 21-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting), a point hardly worth mak-
ing if the decision were limited to the relatively few non-opt-
out class actions.
35 Id. at 10-11.
36 See Oxford American Dictionary 652 (Avon ed. 1982)
(particular: ‘‘special, exceptional’’).
37 Ballard, 79 S.W.3d at 837.
38 See Manual for Complex Litigation Fourth, § 21.612, at
313 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 2004).
39 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3).
40 See, e.g., Amchem Prods Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591,617 (1997) (‘‘While the text of Rule 23(b)(3) does not ex-
clude from certification cases in which individual damages run
high, the Advisory Committee had dominantly in mind vindi-
cation of ‘the rights of groups of people who individually
would be without effective strength to bring their opponents
into court at all.’ ’’) (quoting Kaplan, ‘‘A Prefatory Note,’’ 10
B.C. Ind. & Com. L.Rev. 497, 497 (1969)); Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1309 (3d Cir.1993).
41 See Churchill Village, 361 F.3d at 572.
42 Cf. Devlin, 536 U.S. at 11-14 (criticizing Solicitor Gener-
al’s proposed intervention requirements in large part because
it would engender wasteful litigation and provide little or no
countervailing benefit).
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is.43 Thus, the satellite litigation over intervention will
continue, but with a new twist: It will involve another
round of litigation concerning whether Devlin extends
to opt-out class actions.
This is a most unhappy prospect. Although I am con-
fident that most, if not all, appellate courts will eventu-
ally agree that Devlin applies to opt-out class actions, in
the meantime, we are in for more litigation, with the po-
tential to undermine objectors’ rights. And perhaps
once is not enough. Ultimately, the Supreme Court may
have to say again what it already said in Devlin: A non-
intervening absent class member who files a timely ob-
jection to a proposed class action settlement has a right
to appeal approval of that settlement to a federal court
of appeals.
43 See Thompson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 216 F.R.D.
55, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (case in which, in light of Arkansas Su-
preme Court’s decision in Ballard, objectors ‘‘filed their mo-
tion to intervene out of an abundance of caution to preserve
their right to appeal’’).
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